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CONDUCTING THE CONSTITUTION: JUSTICE SCALIA, 
TEXTUALISM, AND THE EROICA SYMPHONY
Ian Gallacher*
1. INTRODUCTION
The more one studies the debate surrounding modes of Constitutional 
interpretation1, the more dismaying the experience becomes.  Lurking close to 
the surface of the coded discourse of Constitutional scholars is the aggressive 
tone and cultural dynamic of the playground, and the substance of the debate, 
reduced to its essence, seems more akin to a Monty Python sketch2 than the 
scholarly exchange of ideas for which one would hope in this area.3
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1 Some believe that “interpretation” is the wrong word to use to describe the process of 
applying the Constitution.  Jaroslav Pelikan summarizes the issue in relation to biblical 
interpretation:  “For biblical exegis, the technical term ‘to interpret’ in various languages 
(including English) can mean either ‘to translate’ or ‘to expound,’ also because translation 
necessarily involves interpretation.  For constitutional interpretation, too, the situation may 
sometimes be obscured by the technical vocabulary of legal hermeneutics.  Rather than ‘to 
interpret,’ the technical term used in the language of the Supreme Court during the nineteenth 
century (and even beyond) is often the grammatical term ‘to construe,’ for which the cognate 
noun is ‘construction. . . .’”  JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION,
11-12 (2004).  I have taken my cue from Justice Scalia, who uses “interpretation” in the title of his 
book .  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
2 The example that comes readily  to mind is Monty Python’s “Argument Sketch.”  In the 
sketch, a man (“M”) comes to an office seeking an argument, and is directed to speak with Mr. 
Barnard (“B”).   A portion of their discussion gives the flavor for the entire sketch: 
 
M:  Oh look, this isn't an argument. 
B:   Yes it is. 
M:   No it isn't. It's just contradiction. 
B:   No it isn't. 
M:  It is! 
B:   It is not. 
M:  Look, you just contradicted me. 
B:   I did not. 
M:  Oh you did!! 
B:   No, no, no. 
M:  You did just then. 
B:   Nonsense! 
2Justice Scalia has been particularly strident in the tone he has adopted for those 
who disagree with him, and recently told a meeting of the Federalist Society that 
you’d have to be an idiot to believe in a “Living Constitution.”4 No clearer 
example of the recess rhetoric into which this important debate can so quickly 
slide is necessary, and there is no better illustration of why we need to step back 
from this ad hominem abyss and take a more dispassionate view of the 
interpretative techniques we employ to understand the Constitution.   
 
One way to accomplish this is to look elsewhere to see how others tackle similar 
questions of interpretation.  This perhaps allows for a less passionate inquiry into 
the interpretative process, stripped of the life changing outcomes of doctrinal 
orthodoxy;  without being so concerned about the end result, we might be able to 
make more reasoned conclusions about the means used to achieve that result.   
 
M:  Oh, this is futile! 
B:   No it isn't. 
 
JOHN CLEESE, ET AL, MONTY PYTHON’S PREVIOUS RECORD (The Famous Charisma Record Label 
1973),  transcript available at  http://www.mindspring.com/~mfpatton/sketch.htm (last visited 
August 2, 2006). 
3 Speaking about “nonoriginalist” opinions, Justice Scalia observed that, in the past, they 
“have almost always had the decency to lie, or at least to dissemble, about what they were doing 
– either ignoring strong evidence of original intent that contradicted the minimal recited evidence 
of original intent congenial to the court’s desires, or else not discussing original intent at all, 
speaking in terms of broad constitutional generalities with no pretense of historical support.”  
Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849, 852 (1989).  Justice Scalia 
later dismisses the theoretical underpinnings of “nonoriginalism” by claiming that it is 
“incompatib[le] with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”  Id.
at 854.  Justice Scalia is hardly less sympathetic to “originalism,” a theory which, he claims, is 
“also not without its warts”  (id., at 856) whose adherents are “faint-hearted” and whose theory 
of interpretation is no different from the moderate nonoriginalist, “except that the former finds it 
comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks 
that superfluous.”  Id. at 862.  Some years later, Justice Scalia’s views had hardened, describing 
what he now called “strict constructionism” as “a degraded form of textualism that brings the 
whole philosophy into disrepute.”  Scalia, supra n.1, at 23.  On the other side of the debate, 
Ronald Dworkin criticizes Justice Scalia as having “seriously misunderstood the implications of 
his general account for constitutional law, and . . . his lectures therefore have a schizophrenic 
character.”  Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Scalia, supra n.1, at 115.  Later in his comment, 
Professor Dworkin refers to Justice Scalia’s translation of the Eighth Amendment’s meaning as 
“bizarre.”  Id. at 121.  And Justice Scalia claims that “in some sophisticated circles, [textualism] is 
considered simpleminded – ‘wooden,’ ‘unimaginative,’ ‘pedestrian’”  (Scalia, supra n.1, at 23), 
although his failure to cite to sources of those descriptions makes verification of them impossible. 
4 Justice Scalia made this comment at a meeting of the Federalist Society held in Puerto 
Rico in February, 2006.  Associated Press,  Scalia Raps ‘Living Constitution,’  February 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/main1315619.shtml 
(last visited March 8, 2006).  According to the Associated Press report, Justice Scalia said that 
“[t]he argument of [Constitutional] flexibility . . . goes something like this:  The Constitution is 
over 200 years old and societies change.  It has to change with society, like a living organism, or it 
will become brittle and break. . . . But you would have to be an idiot to believe that.”  Id.
3Other than literature, which already has a full body of scholarly work devoted to 
its relationship with the law,5 the most promising fields of intellectual inquiry for 
this experiment are religion and music.6 Religion is, for me at least, disqualified 
because it brings into play numerous moral and ethical issues I would rather 
avoid here.7 But music offers a neutral and potentially helpful forum for my 
purpose. 
 
This is admittedly not new ground.  Timothy Hall has traced scholarly 
comparisons between legal and musical interpretation back to the 14th Century8,
and in more recent times Jerome Frank,9 Richard Posner,10 Hall himself,11 and, 
perhaps most significantly, Levinson and Balkin,12 among others,13 have all 
 
5 I will not even attempt to summarize the goals of the law and literature movement here, 
nor will I attempt to provide a bibliography of its work;  either attempt would swamp this little 
article.  For those interested in the subject, and who are as yet unaware of the many valuable 
insights provided by the study of law and literature, and the many trenchant and well-articulated 
objections to this way of looking at the law, some simple research will generate copious amounts 
of material on both sides of the debate. 
6 Both religion and music, like the law, have texts which must be interpreted.  And both 
areas have their orthodox and reform branches, juxtaposing fundamental textualism with liberal 
interpretation. 
7 For a valuable discussion into the interweaving of religious and legal doctrine, see 
Pelikan, supra n. 1. 
8 Timothy S. Hall,  The Score as Contract:  Private Law and the Historically Informed 
Performance Movement, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1589, 1589-90 (1999), citing, ANONYMOUS, ARS 
CANTUS MENSURABILIS MENSURATA PER MODOS IURIS [THE ART OF MENSURABLE SONG MEASURED 
BY THE MODES OF LAW] (C. Matthew Balensuela ed. & trans., 1994). 
9 Jerome Frank,  Words and Music:  Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1259 (1947). 
10 Richard Posner,  Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN L. REV. 1365 (1990)(book review). 
11 Hall, supra n.8. 
12 Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin,  Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L.REV.
1597 (1991);  Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin,  Interpreting Law and Music:  Performance Notes on 
“The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,”  20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (1999). Not only is 
Levinson and Balkin’s work significant in its recognition that lawyers and musicians (a well as 
textual interpreters in other fields) have much to teach each other (Levinson and Balkin,  Law, 
Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L.REV. at 1656-58), it also has some points of 
intersection with this article;  as does this article, Levinson and Balkin consider questions of pitch 
in musical performance, (id. at 1619-21), consider the significance of a seeming wrong note in a 
Beethoven work (id. at 1598-99;  the work in Levinson and Balkin’s case is the first movement of 
Beethoven’s first piano concerto), and consider the role of the early music movement (their article 
is, at least on the surface, a book review of AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MUSIC (Nicholas Kenyon ed. 
1988).  There are, however, significant differences between Levinson and Balkin’s approach and 
mine.  Levinson and Balkin are more interested than am I in the theory of interpretation, the 
doctrinal underpinnings of the interpretative process.  By contrast, I focus here more on the 
result, the practical effect of those doctrines when applied to a text, making this article, I believe, 
a compliment to Levenson and Balkin’s work. 
4written about the ways in which musical interpretative practices and legal 
interpretative practices can inform each other. 
 
I tread gratefully in the footsteps of these scholars while also trying to branch out 
in a slightly different direction.  My goal here is a very modest one:  to take one 
piece of music – the first movement of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony14 – and 
consider how legal scholars, using the doctrinal principles they have developed 
to interpret the Constitution,  would interpret the piece were they called on to 
conduct it.15 
In so doing, I make no pretense of offering a new genre of legal hermeneutics;  
there is no suggestion here that a “law and musicology” movement will provide 
a comprehensive analytical framework which we can use to solve problems of 
Constitutional interpretation.  Rather, I suggest that musical interpretative 
“doctrines” – if so loose a collection of practices merits the term – share some 
common elements with legal doctrines, and that by viewing the law through the 
 
13 Penelope Pether,  Semiotics:  Or Wishin’ and Hopin’  20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615 (1999); 
Desmond Manderson,  Et Lux Perpetua:  Dying Declarations & Mozart’s Requiem, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1621 (1999); Peter Goodrich,  Operatic Hermeneutics:  Harmony, Euphantasy, and Law  in 
Rossini’s Semiramis,  20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1649 (1999); Judit Frigyesi,  Sacred and Secular – What 
Can Music Teach us About Jewish Thought, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673 (1999);  Hanne Petersen,  
Peripheral Perspectives on Musical Orders, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1683 (1999) 
14 I will use the symphony’s familiar name throughout, even though the work is more 
accurately known as Beethoven’s Third Symphony, Opus 55.  The name “Eroica” became 
attached to the symphony after Beethoven erased an original dedication to Napoleon Bonaparte 
from the symphony’s title page and replaced it with the title “Sinfonia eroico.”  ALEXANDER 
THAYER, THAYER’S LIFE OF BEETHOVEN, 348-49 (Elliot Forbes ed., Princeton University Press 
1973)(1921).  The symphony has been known, in English, as the “Eroica” symphony ever since.  
The Eroica Symphony is an ideal choice for this analysis because it inspires the same sense of 
awe, to many musicians, as does the Constitution for lawyers and judges.  Written at 
approximately the same time (Eroica was written in 1804 and the Constitution was written in 
1787), the Eroica is a work of major significance, not just in Beethoven’s output but for all 
subsequent musicians.  See, e.g., MAYNARD SOLOMON, BEETHOVEN, 192 (1977)(“With [Eroica] we 
know that we have crossed irrevocably a major boundary in Beethoven’s development and in 
music history as well.”)  The length of the first movement alone (it is “one of the longest first 
movements in existence”  ROBERT SIMPSON, BEETHOVEN SYMPHONIES, 19 (1970)) marks the work 
as trail-blazing, and it is the foundation upon which the modern symphonic repertoire is built.  
Later in life, Beethoven identified the Eroica as his favorite symphony (although he had not yet 
written his ninth symphony).  Thayer, at 674. 
15 I have chosen conducting as the musical metaphor for judicial interpretation simply 
because, in this case, the interpretative decisions in the Eroica would typically be made by a 
conductor.  This is not to say, of course, that conductors are the ultimate interpreters.  Nor is it to 
say that the Eroica must be interpreted by a conductor in order to work;  conductorless orchestras 
such as the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra could doubtless perform a compelling interpretation of 
Eroica if they gave themselves enough time to rehearse the piece thoroughly.  The choice of a 
conductor here is merely a reflection of the common practice of performing this particular piece 
with a conductor. 
5different lens that music provides, we might gain some new insight into our own 
doctrinal landscape.  
 
I will be paying most attention here to Justice Scalia and his “textualist” 
approach to interpretation.  Justice Scalia’s dual role as principal advocate for 
one mode of Constitutional interpretation and as one of the Supreme Court 
Justices who put interpretative theory into practice places him in a relationship 
with the Constitution much like that of a conductor and an orchestral score.  Both 
conductor and judgemust approach the text with an interpretative theory in 
mind and then apply that theory in a specific context that is much like a 
“performance.”16 
In particular, though, Justice Scalia’s apparent conviction that a “textualist” 
approach to Constitutional interpretation17 is the only coherent and legitimate 
approach to textual interpretation seems worthy of examination, in a very small 
way, by using it to interpret a text from a different tradition.  The benefits and 
problems of such an approach might stand out in clearer relief when projected 
against a musical, rather than a legal, background. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A fully integrated discussion of the various modes of Constitutional 
interpretation is beyond the scope of this modest article, so to make sure we are 
all at least thinking of the same doctrines,  I will only make an abbreviated and 
admittedly simplistic identification of the three principal theories of 
Constitutional interpretation  in contemporary American jurisprudence:  Justice 
Scalia’s “textualist” approach, in which the analyst limits interpretation to the 
meaning of the words that constitute the text;  the “intentionalist” approach, my 
shorthand description of the familiar “original intent” approach in which the 
interpreter seeks to discern and apply the text drafter’s original intent;  and the 
“contextualist” approach, by which I mean the interpretative practice of allowing 
the contemporary context in which the text is being analyzed to inform the text’s 
meaning.   
 
A. Textualism
16 Levinson and Balkin’s description of law as a “performing art” is, it seems to me, 
precisely correct.  See, Levinson and Balkin, supra n.12. 
17 And not just Constitutional interpretation.  Justice Scalia makes clear that his textualism 
is intended to be an “intelligible theory” that applies to all forms of statutory interpretation.  
Scalia, supra n.1, at 14.  Thus, while I will continue to use Constitutional interpretation as the 
benchmark for legal interpretation here, the legal doctrines I discuss are as applicable to other 
legislative enactments as musical doctrines are applicable to other music than the Eroica. 
6In a sense, the name of this approach is its own description;  “textualism” 
requires a devotion to the text above all other considerations.18 Justice Scalia, the 
most influential of textualists because of his role as Supreme Court justice, insists 
that textualism not be confused with what he calls “strict constructionism” and 
with what I will call here “intentionalism:”  “I am not a strict constructionist, and 
no one ought to be – though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist.  A text 
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently;  it 
should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”19 
An unabashedly formalist approach to interpretation,20 textualism eschews the 
use of canons of construction21 and legislative history22 and rejects the notion of a 
“flexible” Constitution23 in favor of limiting textual interpretation to the limited 
range of meanings associated with the words comprising the text;24 any 
interpretation going beyond the text’s meaning is impermissible.25 
B. Intentionalism
I use this term to mean the familiar interpretative strategy wherein the 
interpreter seeks to glean the meaning imparted into the text by its creator or 
creators.  Although the text in question might be the primary tool used to derive 
this meaning,26 the intentionalist interpreter can and does go outside of the text, 
 
18 See, e.g., Scalia, supra n.1, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too 
dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to 
serve;  or too hide-bound to realize that new times require new laws.  One need only hold the 
belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws.”) 
19 Id.
20 “Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is 
‘formalistic.’  The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic!” Id. at 25 (emphasis in original). 
21 Id. at 25-9. 
22 Id. at 29-37. 
23 Id. at 41-7. 
24 To explain what he means by this, Justice Scalia uses an example from Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).  See Scalia, supra n.1, at 23.  At issue was whether a defendant who 
sought to purchase cocaine in exchange for an unloaded firearm was subject to a statutorily-
imposed sentence enhancement for “using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime.”  Id. at 23-4.  Although the majority of the Supreme Court’s justices voted that this was 
“use” within the contemplation of the language under consideration, Justice Scalia dissented, 
arguing that “[t]he phrase ‘uses a gun’ fairly connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally 
used for, that is, a weapon.”  Id. at 24. 
25 Id.
26 This is not necessarily the case, as Justice Scalia notes.  “A few terms ago, I read a brief 
that began the legal argument with a discussion of legislative history and then continued (I am 
quoting it verbatim):  ‘Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful.  Thus, we turn to the 
other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language.’”  Id. at 31, quoting, Brief for Petitioner at 
21,  Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. 491 U.S. 701 (1989), quoted in, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine 
Co.,  490 U.S. 504, 530 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring)(emphasis in original). 
7usually to look at the legislative history surrounding the text’s creation, in order 
to fully understand the text’s original meaning.27 
C. Contextualism
“Contextualism” is the term I use here to describe the belief that a Constitution is 
a living document, and that its meaning must be derived, in part, from the 
context within which the text is being interpreted.  For a contextualist, a text’s 
meaning is derived from its content, but informed by the values of contemporary 
society.28 
Although Justice Scalia believes that one must be an “idiot” to believe in a living 
Constitution, distinguished jurists from other countries are more sympathetic to 
this approach.  Justice Aharon Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, 
has written an eloquent defense of the contextualist approach to Constitutional 
interpretation: 
 
The intent of the constitutional authors . . .  exists alongside the 
fundamental views and values of modern society at the time of 
interpretation.  The constitution is intended to solve the problems 
of the contemporary person, to protect his or her freedom.  It must 
contend with his or her needs.  Therefore, in determining the 
constitution's purpose through interpretation, one must also take 
into account the values and principles that prevail at the time of 
 
27 Thereby earning Justice Scalia’s disapproval.  “What is most exasperating about the use 
of legislative history . . . is that it does not even make sense for those who accept legislative intent 
as the criterion.  It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a 
genuine one.”  Scalia, supra, n.1, at 31-32 (emphasis in original). 
28 An example used by Justice Scalia to deride this approach works well enough to describe 
it.  Three Supreme Court Justices – Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun – believed the death 
penalty to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though (as Justice Scalia believes and, 
for the purposes of this illustration only, I will accept) the death penalty’s use is contemplated by 
the Constitution.  Scalia, supra n.1, at 46, n.62 and accompanying text.  These Justices reached this 
conclusion not because a prohibition against the death penalty exists in the text of the 
Constitution, or because there appears in the legislative history an indication that the 
Constitution’s framers intended for it to be considered as a “cruel and unusual punishment,” but 
rather because the death penalty had become, in their belief, a cruel and unusual punishment by 
1976 (when Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231 
(1976)(Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) and 1994 (Callins v. Collins,  114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 
(1994)(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)(“ Rather than continue to coddle the 
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation 
eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty 
experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural 
rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional 
deficiencies.”) 
8interpretation, seeking synthesis and harmony between past 
intention and present principle.29 
And the Australian Justice Michael Kirby  has neatly summarized the 
contextualist strategy as requiring that “[t]he meaning and content of the words 
take colour from the circumstances in which the words must be understood and 
to which they must be applied.”30 
III. MUSICAL INTERPRETATION
Interpretative practices in the musical world are similar, although the political 
labels one might attach to proponents of the various schools are reversed.  The 
“conservatives” of the musical world are the contextualists, who believe that 
musical interpretation is an evolving issue and that music should be interpreted 
based on contemporary interpretative criteria.  By contrast, the “radicals” of the 
musical world are the textualists who believe in devotion to the written note and 
to reproducing the written score as faithfully as possible.   
 
A. Musical Contextualism
I use this term here to balance my use of contextualism in a legal context.  It is 
not a term that would be familiar to musicians, amongst whom musical 
contextualists made up, until recently,31 the majority of contemporary 
performers.  They are musicians who interpret music without regard to the 
performance practices or conventions of the time in which the music was 
written,32 and instead offer a idiosyncratic response to the music, in essence 
 
29 Aharon Barak,  A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 16, 69 (2002). 
30 The Hon. Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent:  A Form of 
Ancestor Worship?  1999 Sir Anthony Mason Lecture, University of Melbourne Law Students’ 
Society, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_constitu.htm, (last 
visited March 19, 2006). 
31 I have no empirical support to justify my claim that musical contextualists no longer 
make up the majority of performers, nor can I think of any way to test this assertion, which is 
based on the prevalence of historically-informed performances of music, both in recordings and 
in live performances.  Although such performances are by no means in the majority, most 
performing musicians have been exposed to them and the principles underpinning them, either 
as students or later in their careers.  And while most might be unpersuaded by the goals of 
historically-informed performance practice, and therefore continue to perform music in a more 
“intentionalist” style, some influence of these performances, and the scholarship underpinning 
them, must influence these performers. 
32 Indeed, they often affirmatively reject the fruits of such study.  “How can you recreate 
the circumstances in which the music was first performed? . . . If you bring back those old, out of 
tune violins, then why not have the musicians wear breeches and powdered wigs – why not the 
audience too?  Imitating what we imagine the surface details of early performances to have been 
9encouraging the audience to experience the performer’s personal reaction to the 
musical text. 
 
This is not to say that the musical contextualist’s performance is unthinking or 
anti-intellectual.33 To the contrary, a contextualist performance can be the subtly 
nuanced product of intense textual analysis and careful rehearsal designed to 
clarify the performer’s intentions.  But a contextualist performance is, at its heart, 
a performance of the performer’s interpretation of the work, with no regard to 
the soundworld34 the composer might have had in mind when the piece was 
written. 
 
B. Musical Textualism
Standing in direct contrast to the contextualist approach is the musical textualist 
approach,35 one in which the composer’s soundworld is very much an element of 
the performance.  Musical textualist performances are characterized by their 
attention to the performing styles and conditions prevailing at the time a musical 
text was written36, usually using instruments of the time or contemporary 
recreations of these instruments.37 
doesn’t bring us inside Mozart’s heart and mind and it trivializes him.  We need a revival of the 
instruments of that period about as much as we need the kind of dentistry they practiced.”  
Stephen Wigler,  Authenticity, Russian-Style, in Mozart’s Requiem, in OVERTURE: BALTIMORE 
SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA PROGRAM BOOK 13, 14 (2001) quoting, Yuri Temirkanov, Music Director, 
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra. 
33 Charles Rosen, one of the most intellectual of musicians, nonetheless rejects the influence 
of musicology on performance in the deft phrase “musicology is for musicians what ornithology 
is to birds.”  CHARLES ROSEN, THE FRONTIERS OF MEANING, 72 (1995), quoted in, Bernard D. 
Sherman,  An Atmosphere of Controversy, in INSIDE EARLY MUSIC: CONVERSATIONS WITH 
PERFORMERS, 3 (Bernard Sherman ed., 1997). 
34 I use the term “soundworld” here to capture a myriad of technical performance details, 
such as pitch, instrument choice, articulation, and so on, that collectively make up the sound of 
the music. 
35 Although I use this term to draw parallels to what Justice Scalia calls a textualist 
approach in legal interpretation, the two are not mirror images.  In particular, while the musical 
textualist seeks to simulate the composer’s soundworld, it would be the rare (and foolhardy) 
musical textualist who would argue that any performance could accurately portray only those 
interpretative gestures intended by the composer to the exclusion of all other influences. 
36 This approach to musical interpretation was often called the “early music revival” (see,
Sherman, supra n.34) but this term is no longer valid (if, indeed, it ever was) in light of 
performances of Brahms (ROGER NORRINGTON, JOHANNES BRAHMS, SYMPHONY NO. 1, OP. 68 (EMI 
Classics 1991)), Wagner (ROGER NORRINGTON, WAGNER  (EMI Classics 1995)), and Verdi (JOHN 
ELLIOT GARDINER, GIUSEPPE VERDI, MESSA DA REQUIEM  (Phillips 1992)) that bring contemporary 
textualist-based performances to the threshold of music written during the sound recording era. 
37 The changes in instrument construction can have a profound effect on the way an 
instrument sounds and in the way an instrumentalist plays the instrument.  For examples, 
playing on strings made of gut, as opposed to steel, can have a significant effect on how much 
vibrato the instrumentalist uses.  See, Bernard D. Sherman,  Aladdin’s Lamp:  Anner Bylsma on the 
10
Textualist performances are not identical, because performers are almost always 
instrumentalists first and scholars second,38 and musicians will often disagree as 
to the significance of the historical record.39 While musical textualist 
performances will differ in detail and sound, however, they are united in the 
attention they pay to the historical record and the sound instruments of the 
period of a piece’s composition would make. 
C. Musical Intentionalists
Located somewhere on the continuum between those two polar opposites are the 
intentionalists, performers who take the printed score as their principal point of 
departure but who will countenance changes to the text to clarify what they 
believe to be the composer’s intentions.  Without any concrete support for this 
statement, I believe that musical “intentionalists” make up the majority of 
contemporary performers. 
 
Perhaps the most concise statement of intentionalist principles comes from the 
conductor, Erich Leinsdorf:  “1.  Great composers knew what they wanted.  2.  
The interpreter must have the means at his disposal to grasp the composers’ 
intentions.  3.  Music must be read with knowledge and imagination – without 
necessarily believing every note and word that is printed.”40 Intentionalist 
performers will typically use contemporary instruments but will be influenced, 
to a greater or lesser degree, by scholarship about performance practice.41 
IV. PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
Cello (and Vivaldi, and Brahms) in INSIDE EARLY MUSIC, supra n.34, 207, 210-11 n.9 and 
accompanying text (discussing the changes in string composition and the effect on vibrato). 
38 “. . . I think the mastering of an instrument never goes through reading first, and then 
playing.  It goes through playing first, and then reading – and having good colleagues, especially 
people who play other instruments.”  Anner Bylsma, quoted in, Aladdin’s Lamp, supra n.37, at 209. 
39 For example, Anner Bylsma, a cellist who plays on baroque cellos, believes that 
performers should vibrate on dissonances, not consonances.  Id. at 211.  By contrast, Julianne 
Baird, an American soprano specializing in baroque music, believes that dissonant notes should 
not be sung with vibrato.  Bernard D. Sherman,  Beyond the Beautiful Pearl:  Julianne Baird on 
Baroque Singing) in INSIDE EARLY MUSIC, supra n.34, 225, 235-36. 
40 ERICH LEINSDORF, THE COMPOSER’S ADVOCATE: A RADICAL ORTHODOXY FOR MUSICIANS,
viii (1981). 
41 Amongst conductors, Sir Charles Mackerras and Sir Simon Rattle have both conducted 
period-instrument orchestras and have allowed that experience to inform the performances they 
give with contemporary-instrument orchestras.  David Zinman’s recordings of Beethoven 
symphonies seek to recreate Beethoven’s metronome markings and sound as if the conductor has 
studied, and learned from, the phrasing and articulation typical of period-instrument orchestra 
performances. 
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Having laid out the principal themes of this article, we now need to look more 
closely at the first movement of the Eroica symphony and think about how 
Justice Scalia, as a textualist conductor, will employ his doctrinal philosophy to 
the interpretative decisions presented by the piece. 
 
This is not a simple process;  conductors face an almost incalculable number of 
decisions over the course of a movement as long as this,42 and any attempt to 
discuss each of them would bog this discussion down irretrievably.  Rather than 
attempt this impossible task, we will consider here three principle interpretative 
elements – pitch, tempo, and textual error – and will also consider the particular 
problems raised by the Eroica’s first movement coda.  Although this approach 
will leave numerous issues untouched, it should serve to give us an insight into 
the way legal interpretative doctrines can produce expected and unexpected 
results when applied to musical performance. 
 
A. Pitch
The Eroica symphony is in Eb major and begins with a short but arresting 
introduction of two Eb major chords, played forte by the entire orchestra, before 
the first subject begins with a piano theme that outlines an Eb major triad, played 
by the cellos:43 


 


 



 
p
           

f

  
     
5
                  
  
    
 
 
                                                 
42  In addition to the numerous decisions a conductor must make before the first rehearsal – 
a tiny fraction of which are discussed in this article – the conductor must, at rehearsal, tailor an 
interpretative conception of a work to the capabilities of the orchestra, incorporating those 
interpretative decisions made independently by the musicians that fit the conductor’s overall 
interpretation and rejecting those that do not.  And in performance, the conductor must be 
exquisitely attuned to the sound and energy of the performance, adjusting previously decided-
upon interpretative details if necessary. 
43  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3 IN Eb MAJOR (EROICA) (Max Unger ed., Ernst 
Eulenberg 1936), measures 1-7.  (Transcription by author).  
 12 
And this brings us to our first problem:  before the orchestra plays a note, the 
conductor has to decide what Eb the orchestra should play. 
 
This would, at first impression, appear to be a non-issue.  Instrumentalists have a 
limited number of ways to play a note, and while each might produce a slightly 
different timbre, and might therefore be the subject of discussion during 
rehearsal, an Eb would seem to be an Eb.  But which Eb the orchestra should 
play is a more nuanced question than this, and the answer depends on the A to 
which the orchestra has tuned.44  The current standard A was set by the ISO as 
440 Hz in 1955.45  Many contemporary orchestras, however, prefer the brighter 
sound given by an A of 441 or even 442 Hz.46  The contextualist would likely be 
unperturbed by this, and would accept whatever A is on offer or, as is the case in 
some American orchestras, is contractually required.47 
 
The intentionalist and textualist, however, would both have to consider the pitch 
problem more carefully.  To accurately predict Justice Scalia’s pitch choice, we 
must look at the original text and try to understand what a composer meant by 
Eb in 1804 Vienna, the year and place in which Eroica was written.48  We know 
                                                 
44  Orchestras tune to an A given by the oboe before each half of a concert, and usually 
between pieces as well.  The convention of using an A to tune presumably has something to do 
with A being a convenient tuning note for all string instruments, the majority of instruments in 
an orchestra.  The oboe gives the pitch (unless the orchestra is playing a piano concerto) because 
it possesses a “high[] degree of sheer cutting power” and because of “a particularly strong 
fundamental in its harmonic structure, and its vibrant expressiveness. . . .”  NORMAN DEL MAR,  
ANATOMY OF THE ORCHESTRA, 169 (1981). 
45  Mark Lindley, et al,  Pitch, in THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, XIV, 
785 (1980). 
46  The Boston Symphony Orchestra, for example, tunes to an A of 441 Hz.  E-mail from 
Lucia Lin, first violinist, Boston Symphony Orchestra, to Ian Gallacher (July 29, 2006, 01:54 
EST)(on file with author).  By contrast, my home orchestra, the Syracuse Symphony Orchestra, 
tunes to an A of 440 Hz.  Telephone interview with Richard Decker, General Manager, Syracuse 
Symphony Orchestra (August 2, 2006).  Orchestras can run into pitch problems when playing in 
remote locations.  The pianos at Carnegie Hall, for example, were tuned at an A of 442 Hz when 
the Syracuse Symphony played there in 2003.  Id.  This required the orchestra to change its tuning 
patterns to conform to the hall’s requirements.  Id.  An extreme example of this pitch variation 
was experienced at the 2006 Promenade Concerts in London, where the Steinway piano company 
was asked to deliver a piano tuned at A = 444Hz for a performance by the Bamberg Symphony 
Orchestra.  Interview with Ulrich Gerhardt, Steinway & Sons, (BBC radio broadcast, August 2, 2006). 
47  The Syracuse Symphony Orchestra’s A = 440,  for example, is contractually required.  
Interview with Richard Decker, supra n.46.  A conductor directing an orchestra with a pre-
determined A would, of course, have little input into what A the orchestra should use.  Any 
conductor conducting a modern instrument orchestra must expect that all works on the program 
will be played at a pitch centered on A = 440, with very narrow variances.  For most conductors 
working today, a consideration of which pitch to use would be unnecessary and superfluous. 
48  Just as Justice Scalia believes that the Eighth Amendment is “rooted in the moral 
perceptions of the time [in which it was written]” (Scalia, supra n.1, at 145 (emphasis in original)), 
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from a collection of tuning forks that in 1810, opera houses in Dresden, Berlin, 
and Paris, as well as the London Philharmonic Society, were all using an A that 
was “a significant portion of a semitone lower” than the contemporary 440 Hz 
standard. 49  Although Vienna seems to have welcomed a brighter, higher sound 
than other cities,50 and while this was a period of rapid technological change, 
allowing for brighter tone and a sharper pitch,51 it is likely that the Viennese Eb 
was still substantially flatter than the note we recognize as Eb today.52 
 
In selecting a pitch for his performance, Justice Scalia would likely look to what 
the text could reasonably be understood to mean, rather than what it was 
intended to mean – the “semantic intention” rather than the “original 
intention,”53 even though this appears to be a very nice distinction between two 
facially similar propositions.  Seeking to clarify his position, Justice Scalia has 
used as an example the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and 
unusual” language, concluding that the words abstract “the existing society’s 
assessment of what is cruel” rather than “whatever may be considered cruel 
from one generation to the next.”54  Although this explains his disdain for the 
contextualist approach, the distinction between semantic and original intention is 
less clear, as is how a semantic intention can be determined without an inquiry, 
as here, into what we may call the legislative history of the meaning of Eb to 1804 
Viennese musical society.55 
                                                                                                                                                 
so can we be sure that he would seek to interpret the Eroica symphony with a pitch decision 
rooted in the pitch perceptions of its time. 
49  Lindley, supra n.45, at 782.  The evidence suggests that A was “remarkably close to the 
‘present-day pitch . . .’ recorded by Praetorious 200 years earlier.  Id. at 785.  Praetorious’ pitch 
was “about 3/5 of an equal tempered semitone below the modern standard a’ = 440. . . .”  Id. at 
781-82. 
50  Id. at 785 (noting that the flautist A.B. Fürstenau is known to have bought his first 
Viennese flute – presumably built at the higher pitch popular in Vienna – from Koch in           
1821. . . .”) 
51  Id. (“The availability of better gut strings for the violin and the concurrent alterations to 
the structure of the instrument . . . accommodated a change in taste involving the need for 
competing instrumentalists and orchestras to produce the ‘larger’ sound necessary to fill larger 
concert halls and opera houses.  In descriptions of high pitch levels, disparaging terms like 
‘strident’ gave way to appreciative ones such as ‘brilliant.’”) 
52  The difference in pitch might seem arithmetically small, but the difference in sound can 
be dramatic.  Recordings go in and out of print so rapidly these days that it is impossible to state 
with certainty that a particular recording demonstrating this difference will be available, but a 
relatively recent recording by Roger Norrington offers a performance pitched at A=430 Hz.  
ROGER NORRINGTON,  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (EMI Records 
1989). 
53  Scalia, supra n.1, at 144. 
54  Id. at 145. 
55  The symbols on the page of the Eroica have not changed in the intervening 200 years, just 
as the words “cruel and unusual” look the same to us as when they were first written in the 
context of the Eighth Amendment in 1791.  Without an understanding of the context in which 
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No matter.  We can safely conclude that Justice Scalia would conduct Eroica in 
what 19th Century Vienna would assess Eb major to mean, rather than what Eb 
major has come to mean today.  This is, of course, a difficult result, and 
condemns Justice Scalia to make an evaluation of the pitch information for every 
piece he conducts, just as he should consider every statute as “meaning” what 
the words meant when chosen by the drafters at the time of drafting.56  But it is 
the only result consistent with a textualist philosophy. 
 
B. Tempo 
 
So now the orchestra can play the Eroica’s first, Eb major chord, even though it 
sounds to contemporary ears like a slightly sharp D major.  But before the 
orchestra plays the second chord, a conductor must decide in what tempo the 
movement will be played.  And this determination is somewhat more 
complicated than the pitch issue we have just resolved.57 
 
The text itself gives us three clues:  the time words “Allegro con brio;”  the 
metronome marking of a dotted half = 60 (quarter note = 180);  and a theme that 
has a swinging, one beat to a measure, feeling about it, with some faster 
figuration passages later in the movement.58  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
those symbols were written, we might be lured into believing that the meaning they convey had 
not changed either.  Yet as we have seen, a study of pitch reveals far greater ambiguity than 
might at first have been apparent, and the “meaning” of the Eroica’s text, at least as to pitch, was 
far different from that which we might understand and hear today.  This “meaning,” however, 
can only be revealed by a study of the historical record.  The difference between the textualist and 
intentionalist approach appears to be the difference between studying the meaning of Eb to the 
general Viennese musical community of 1804 and the meaning of Eb to Beethoven specifically.  
Since the two seem likely to render similar, if not identical results, Justice Scalia’s insistence on 
one over the other would seem odd when viewed in a musical context. 
56  As even this fleeting glimpse into the issue demonstrates, coming to a definitive sense of 
what pitch “means” for a particular piece requires study into not just the year of composition, but 
also the location of composition and the practices then prevalent.  And the pitch issue stands as a 
proxy for a host of additional interpretative decisions a conductor must make.  Issues like what 
types of instruments will generate the pitches (violins, for example, have changed radically 
through the years and pre-19th century instruments have all been physically altered to 
accommodate these changes), the balance of different instrument groups (how many first violins, 
second violins, and so on the orchestra should contain), the methods of articulation used by those 
instruments, just to name a few of the concerns, must be considered and resolved by a conductor 
seeking to recreate the semantic intentions of the original soundworld contemplated by a musical 
text as faithfully as possible.  
57  It is also, unlike the pitch determination, one that all conductors must make. 
58  Eroica, supra. n. 43, measures 65-68. 
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
               
                 

 
 
Each of these clues presents some problems.  The time words “Allegro con brio” 
translate as “fast, with vigor.”  Not the most illuminating instruction and one 
that, like much of the Constitution’s text, is open to a substantial amount of 
interpretation:  the concept of “fast” is as variable from person to person as is the 
concept of how much process is “due,” and “vigor” is a term that is more helpful 
in determining expression than tempo.59 
 
The metronome marking is, on its face, more helpful.  Unlike pitch, the number 
of beats per minute, and the means of measuring them, has not changed since the 
19th century,60 and a metronome marking appears to give us a scientific 
designation of tempo.  But Beethoven added the metronome markings to his 
symphonies only in 1817,61 13 years after Eroica was first performed, making 
them more like an amendment to the original text. 
 
In fact, the metronome marking complicates rather than simplifies the tempo 
problem because it designates a very fast tempo, leading some to believe that 
Beethoven could not have intended the tempi suggested by the metronome 
markings he supplied.62  Yet scholars who have studied the issue have concluded 
that the metronome markings for Eroica are consistent with the markings 
Beethoven gave for other music he wrote, and that he had a taste for very fast 
tempos that was shared by his contemporaries and near contemporaries like 
Schubert, Rossini, Spohr, and Mendelssohn.63 
 
The internal evidence, suggested by the orchestra’s ability to play the figuration 
in some of the movement’s passages, was the most important tempo clue for 
                                                 
59  At least on a superficial reading.  In fact, however, the notion that the movement is to be 
played “with vigor” might go some way to explaining  the character, and therefore the tempo, of 
the faster moving portions of the movement, discussed infra at nn. 51-52 and accompanying text, 
and is therefore useful as a tempo marking after all as, of course, Beethoven intended. 
60  The modern metronome was patented by Johann Nepomuk Maelzel around 1815.  E.G. 
Richardson,  Metronome, in THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, XII, 222-23 
(1980). 
61  Beethoven’s table of metronome markings for the eight symphonies he had written to 
that point (Beethoven wrote the Ninth Symphony in 1824) was published in December, 1817.  
Thayer, supra n.14, at 687. 
62  Peter Stadlen rejected many of the fast metronome markings in Beethoven’s symphonies 
as “totally unacceptable.”  Peter Stadlen,  Beethoven and the Metronome, 9 Soundings  38 (1982),  
quoted by,  Clive Brown,  Historical Performance, Metronome Marks and Tempo in Beethoven’s 
Symphonies,  19 Early Music 247, 249 (1991). 
63  Brown, supra, n.62, at 258. 
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performers in Beethoven’s time.64  And some of Eroica’s rapid figuration 
passages can sound rushed, to our ears, when taken close to Beethoven’s 
designated metronome mark.65  In fact, very few performers – even those striving 
to make their performances as historically informed as possible – reach and 
sustain a tempo of quarter = 180.  An analysis by Eric Grunin of nearly 350 
recorded performances of the piece shows only one performance, conducted by 
Hermann Scherchen in 1958, as having a sustained tempo anywhere close, at 
quarter = 174.6.66 
 
For Justice Scalia, however, the internal evidence is likely unhelpful – an insight 
into the composer’s “intent” he would reject as irrelevant.67  And while 
Beethoven added the metronome marking later, the framers of the Constitution 
amended it as well and once adopted, those amendments must receive the 
textualist treatment. 68 Justice Scalia’s Eroica will likely be very fast. 
 
C. Mistakes 
 
It would be presumptuous for me to assert that Beethoven made “mistakes” in 
anything he wrote.69  But mistakes could and did occur in the copying of the 
                                                 
64  Id.,  at 252(“As well as [the meter and tempo terms], the character of the particular piece – 
its mood, the nature of its themes and especially the types of figuration employed in its fastest 
notes – would have a significant bearing on the tempo. . . .  But perhaps the most important 
additional factor was the proportion of fastest notes within a given section.  As Schulz observed:  
‘If a piece in 2/4 is marked Allegro and contains only a few or even no [sixteenth notes], then the 
movement of the meter is faster than when it is full of [sixteenth notes];  the case is the same with 
the slower tempos.’”) 
65  Two recorded performances in particular come close to Beethoven’s metronome marking 
for this movement;  those conducted by Norrington (supra  n.52:  historical instruments and 
A=440 Hz) and Zinman (DAVID ZINMAN,  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO, 3 IN E FLAT 
MAJOR OP. 55 “EROICA” (Arte Nova 1998):  modern instruments and contemporary pitch). 
66  Available at  http://www.grunin.com/eroica (last visited August 2, 2006).  Grunin’s 
study, which tracks tempi and repeat observance in 351 performances of Eroica from the 1920s to 
the present-day, suggests that “fast” tempi in Eroica’s first movement have remained relatively 
constant, ultra-slow performances have gone out of fashion today, and that ultra-fast 
performances are slowing down as well, having reached a peak in the late 1980s.  Id. 
67  Scalia, supra n.1, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in 
a statute:  the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”) 
68  See, Scalia, supra n.1, passim.   As we know, most of the action in Constitutional 
interpretation revolves around the Bill of Rights, and Justice Scalia’s textualist philosophy is 
grounded in an approach to the interpretation of those first ten amendments to the Constitution. 
69  The same might also be true for other composers considered to be in the “great 
composers” pantheon, like Bach and Mozart, but lesser composers are much less fortunate.  
Perhaps the most famous example is Schumann, a composer whose orchestral music was 
rewritten almost as a matter of course by Nineteenth and Twentieth century conductors on the 
grounds that his orchestrational skills were weak.  See, e.g.,  HANS GÁL,  SCHUMANN  ORCHESTRAL 
MUSIC, 20 (1979)(“One glance at the scores of Schumann’s late years . . . reveals a desperate 
anxiousness to secure every melodic and harmonic detail by extensive doubling, the result of 
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original holographic manuscript and can become deeply entrenched in a 
performance tradition once they are printed.70  One of a conductor’s principal 
jobs is finding and correcting these mistakes when they occur,71 and there is an 
interesting example of a potential misprint in the Eroica score. 
 
In measure 494, the double bass has a quarter rest, a quarter note Eb, and then a 
quarter rest, in contrast to the 1st bassoon, which plays an Eb of the same octave 
on the first beat of the bar.72 
 




       

    
 
 
 
This is an odd result, a syncopated effect that bears no apparent relationship to 
the musical texture that Beethoven has established up to this point.  Most 
significantly, this recapitulation passage differs from the parallel measure in the 
exposition;  the first time the companion to this measure was heard, the 
comparable bass and bassoon notes are both together on the first beat of the 
measure.73 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
which is sometimes an oppressive dullness and sluggishness of sound.  Schumann has always 
been abused for this and his scores have been subjected to arbitrary retouchings. . . .”) 
70  Even orchestras with ready access to original source material can fall prey to this 
tendency.  In 1933, Adrian Boult, an English conductor, noticed that the Vienna Philharmonic’s 
string section slurred the first two notes of the second movement of Mozart’s G minor symphony, 
K. 550.  Boult suggested that they should check the autograph manuscript, which was upstairs 
from the rehearsal hall.  When the orchestra players realized that the slur was not in Mozart’s 
manuscript, they removed it from their parts.  MICHAEL KENNEDY,  ADRIAN BOULT,  159 (1987). 
71  At least this is one perspective of a conductor’s function.  Others might argue that since 
these mistakes have become entrenched in the soundworld of a piece, they should be preserved 
as if they were the composer’s original intent.  A cynic might argue that conductors only change 
the mistakes they can hear, meaning that most mistakes continue to be performed by virtue of 
incompetence rather than intention.  I choose to take the high road here and assume that 
conductors will identify all potential mistakes and will correct those that, upon reflection, appear 
to be genuine errors rather than textual novelties. 
72  Eroica,  supra. n.43, measures 494-95. 
73  Id.,  measures 90-1. 
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



     
 

 
 
  
 
 
Based on this evidence, and on his estimation of the musical sense of the piece, 
the conductor and amateur musicologist74 Norman del Mar concludes that the 
recapitulation bass Eb “can hardly be correct.”75  And he notes that “[t]he whole 
section both in the exposition and recapitulation seems to have been scribbled in 
hastily, being the last passages to be composed and inserted into spaces left 
blank for the purpose long after the rest of the movement was complete.”76 
 
Unfortunately, del Mar left no indication as to how he reached his conclusions 
regarding the compositional history of the movement;  he cites no authority and 
he was known as a conductor,77 not a specialist in the arcana of musicology, as is 
his son.78  But accepting, for purposes of argument, his analysis, the path for the 
intentionalist and the contextualist conductor seems clear – the printed work fails 
to represent Beethoven’s original intention and, in any case, appears to be a 
                                                 
74  In distinction to his son, Jonathan del Mar, whose critical edition of the Beethoven 
symphonies is the latest word in the practical musicological study of these works.  LUDWIG VAN 
BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONIES 1-9 (Jonathan del Mar ed.,  Bärenreiter 1996-2000).   I have not used the 
del Mar edition in preparing this article because it has not yet, I believe, become the standard 
performing edition of the Eroica symphony.  For those interested in hearing the differences 
wrought by the del Mar edition, David Zinman’s recordings of the nine Beethoven symphonies 
uses the del Mar edition.  Zinman, supra n.65 (“ARTE NOVA is the first label to produce all of the 
Beethoven symphonies based upon the new critical Bärenreiter Edition by Jonathan Del Mar on 
modern instruments, under the baton of a world-class conductor.”) 
75  NORMAN DEL MAR,  ORCHESTRAL VARIATIONS:  CONFUSION AND ERROR IN THE 
ORCHESTRAL REPERTOIRE,  22 (1981). 
76  Id. 
77  Norman del Mar was an English conductor, composer, and writer on music who was, at 
times, principal conductor of the BBC Scottish Orchestra, the Göteborg Symphony Orchestra and 
the Academy of the BBC.  He was the author of several books, including an extensive three-
volume critical appreciation of Richard Strauss.  John Warrack,  Norman Del Mar, in THE NEW 
GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, V, 351-52 (1980). 
78  Those seeking a taste of how detailed musicological studies can be can gain a glimpse 
into this world by downloading Jonathan del Mar’s follow-up report (“nachtrag”) to his critical 
commentary on the Beethoven symphonies, available at, https://www.baerenreiter.com/cgi-
bin/baer_V5_my/baerenreiter?op=newuid&ln=en&wrap_html=indexframe.htm (visited July 30, 
2006).  The discussion of a new source of information about the Eroica – orchestral parts found in 
the Roudice Lobkowicz Collection (Nelahozeves Castle, Czech Republic) – includes a lengthy 
consideration of the significance of orange crayon markings, none of which are by Beethoven, to 
the publication history of the symphony.  Id. at 7. 
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misprint.  Both will rewrite the bass part, putting the double bass’s Eb on the first 
beat where it belongs. 
 
The textualist’s position seems equally clear.  Ignoring the evidence of  internal 
inconsistency from the exposition and disregarding del Mar’s subjective and 
contextualist contention that the note “can hardly be correct,” Justice Scalia and 
other textualists should play the bass Eb as written in the text. 
 
Except that while Justice Scalia claims to be a textualist and a formalist, he denies 
that he is a literalist, and he therefore will accept the correction of “scrivener’s 
errors.”79  He notes that “where on the very face of the statute it is clear to the 
reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been 
made[,] . . . it [is] not contrary to sound principles of interpretation . . . to give the 
totality of context precedence over a single word.”80 
 
This seems a strange position for a textualist to take.81  Either the text should be 
taken on its face value or it should not.82   But Justice Scalia is willing to go even 
                                                 
79  Scalia, supra n.1, at 20-21. 
80  Id. 
81  Ronald Dworkin questions Justice Scalia’s position on this point, noting that “[a] careless 
reader might object, however, that any coherent account of statutory interpretation must be based 
on assumptions about someone’s (or some body’s) intention, and that Scalia’s own account 
accepts this at several points.”  Dworkin, Comment, in Scalia, supra n.1, at 115.  He argues later 
that such pragmatic exceptions to pure textualism “undermine Scalia’s position altogether, 
because they recognize not only the intelligibility but the priority of legislative intention, both of 
which he begins by denying.”  Id., at 116. 
82  In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that composers sometimes make intentional 
decisions that can seem to others, even those well-attuned to the composer’s style, to be mistakes.  
In the first movement of Eroica, immediately before the recapitulation section begins, Beethoven 
writes a two measure pianissimo statement of the theme, in its correct key, for the second horn.  
This two measures, coming, as it does, before the tonic key of Eb major has been firmly 
reestablished for the recapitulation, can sound like a mistake in the part or by an inattentive horn 
player.  So, at least, it appeared to Ferdinand Ries, who was at the first playing through of the 
symphony:  “To one unfamiliar with the score this must always sound as if the horn player has 
made a miscount and entered at the wrong place.  At the first rehearsal of the symphony, which 
was horrible, but at which the horn player made his entry correctly, I stood beside Beethoven, 
and , thinking that a blunder had been made I said:  ‘Can’t the damned hornist count? – it sounds 
infamously false!’  I think I came pretty close to receiving a box on the ear.  Beethoven did not 
forgive the slip for a long time.”  FRANZ WEGELER & FERDINAND RIES,  BIOGRAPHISCHE NOTIZEN 
ÜBER LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN (1845), quoted by, Thayer, supra n.14, at 350.  Beethoven had, in fact, 
planned this apparent error carefully and a review of his 1803 sketchbook, which contains much 
of the working-out of the symphony,  shows that it had been an integral part of the movement 
since the early stages of its composition.  GUSTAV NOTTEBOHM,  TWO BEETHOVEN SKETCHBOOKS:  A 
DESCRIPTION WITH MUSICAL EXTRACTS, 72 (Jonathan Katz, trans. 1979).  Of course, Justice Scalia 
the conductor would decline to use the sketches or Riese’s comments in making his 
determination as to whether the seeming “mistake” is or is not a scrivener’s error, since both 
would constitute a form of legislative history. 
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further, acknowledging that some words and phrases in a text should be given 
expansive rather than narrow interpretations.  He argues, for example, that the 
First Amendment’s “freedom of speech” and “freedom of the press” should 
include within them the concept of handwritten notes, even though these are 
neither spoken nor printed words and the First Amendment makes no mention 
of them.83  The concept of handwritten words, apparently, inheres in the “limited 
range of meaning” of the word “speech,” even though the word’s dictionary 
meanings would suggest otherwise.84 
 
This interstitial textualism, where we have to look in the gaps between 
definitions to ascertain a word’s complete meaning, seems strangely at odds with 
a textualist philosophy, something that has not gone unnoticed by Ronald 
Dworkin, who argues that a secret intentionalism must lie at the heart of Scalian 
textualism. 85  Putting aside our qualms, though, we will change the double bass 
part at measure 494, making it align musically with the bassoon line.  And in a 
rare moment of intellectual alignment, all three interpretative doctrines agree 
that this is the correct result. 
 
But as we shall see, the strange results are not over.  Justice Scalia’s textualist 
philosophy has other troubling anomalies, exposed by the last conducting 
problem I have picked from the many posed by Eroica’s first movement – one of 
the most celebrated and controversial conducting problems in the symphonic 
canon.  To understand it takes a little set-up. 
 
D. Coda 
 
By the time of the first movement coda, every listener to the piece is familiar with 
the triadic principal theme of the movement, given here again for comparative 
purposes.86   
 
 
   
   
 
 
                                                 
83  Scalia, supra n.1, at 37-38. 
84  See, id. at 38 (“In this constitutional context, speech and press, the two most common 
forms of communication, stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole.  That is not strict 
construction, but it is reasonable construction.”). 
85  Dworkin, supra n.3, at 16  (“If judges can appeal to a presumed legislative intent to add to 
the plain meaning of ‘speech’ and ‘press’ . . . why can they not appeal to the same legislative 
intent [in other circumstances]?  Scalia’s answer to this objection must not rely on any self-
destructive ‘practicality’ claim.  It must rely instead on a distinction between kinds of intention, a 
distinction he does not make explicitly, but that must lie at the heart of his theory if the theory is 
defensible at all”)(emphasis in original). 
86  Eroica, supra. n.43, measures 3-6. 
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In the coda,87 Beethoven alters the contours of the theme to give it an 
appropriately peroratory effect.88   
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
The new form of the theme is first played piano by the horn, then again in the 1st 
violins, then again in the lower strings – this time with a crescendo – and then is 
played forte in the winds and, most prominently, by the trumpets.89  
 



f
   
       
 
 
       

         
         
           
 
 
The problem is that the trumpets – the loudest of the instruments playing this 
version of the theme – do not actually play the entire theme.  Rather, they only 
play two and 2/3 measures of the theme before joining the non theme-playing 
instruments in a harmonizing ostinato. 90 
 
 
   
          
 
The simple reason for this is that the trumpet Beethoven wrote for could not 
comfortably reach the high sounding Bb (written G) necessary to play the new 
version of the theme.91  Faced with this technical problem, Beethoven had the 
trumpets play as much of the line as they could and then dropped them into the 
background. 
 
But contemporary trumpets can play the high Bb with more or less ease, and 
Norman del Mar, writing in 1981, noted that while “[a]lthough in these days of 
purism and scholarship emendations to Beethoven’s texture are far less often 
                                                 
87  Beginning in measure 631. 
88  Eroica, supra. n.43, measures 631-34.  I have transposed the theme to the bass clef here so 
the differences in the theme can be seen more clearly.  In the symphony, this theme first appears 
at these measures played by a horn in Eb, playing in the treble clef. 
89  Id., measures 655-58. 
90  Id.  The example here is given in transposed form.  In the score, the Eb trumpet line is 
written in C.   
91  del Mar, supra n.75, at 22 (“[T]he upper G on the large Eb trumpet – now extinct for all 
intents and purposes – [was] considered too high and perilous for orchestral use. . . .”) 
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made than of yore, it is rare indeed to hear a performance in which the trumpets 
play as printed . . . and it is . . . customary for the trumpets to bring fulfillment to 
the climax by playing the whole statement of the great theme in their turn.”92   
This change transforms the trumpet line93 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
and transforms the entire texture of the sound at this point in the coda. 
 
It is true that del Mar was a brass player before he was a conductor,94 so perhaps 
we should not be too surprised by his opinion here.  But other conductors, at 
least conductors from the previous generation, agree;  the tradition of rewriting 
the trumpet part started over 100 years ago with Bülow95 and is affirmed by such 
authorities as Weingartner96 and Markevich,97 who said that this alteration “is 
without doubt well-founded.”98 
                                                 
92  Id. 
93  Eroica, supra. n.43, measures 655-58, as rewritten. 
94  del Mar studied the horn and composition at the Royal College of Music.  John Warrack, 
Norman Del Mar, supra n.75, at 351.  The book that became “Orchestral Variations” had its genesis 
in del Mar’s time as a brass player.  “Already, while still a horn player, I had begun noting down 
. . . textual enigmas that arose during rehearsals.”  del Mar, supra n.75, at ix. 
95  See, e.g.,  FELIX WEINGARTNER, WEINGARTNER ON MUSIC AND CONDUCTING, 101 (Jessie 
Crossland trans., Dover Publications 1969) (1907) (“Bülow here allowed the theme to be played 
throughout by the trumpets. . . .”)  Hans von Bülow was a German conductor and pianist of the 
Nineteenth Century.  He studied with Wagner and Liszt and married Liszt’s daughter Cosima in 
1857, although Cosima left him in 1869 in order to marry Wagner.  As a pianist, he gave the first 
American performance of Tschaikovsky’s First Piano Concerto, and as a conductor, he conducted 
the first performances of Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde  and Die Meistersinger.  Corneel Mertens,  
Hans von Bülow, in THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, III, 451-53 (1980). 
96  Id.  (“The indistinct character of the theme when played without this correction quite 
justifies us in adopting it.”)  Felix Weingartner was an Austrian conductor who succeeded 
Mahler as principal conductor of the Vienna Court Opera and is remembered today as “. . . one of 
the most eminent classical conductors of his day, outstanding for the clarity and economy of his 
beat, for the lack of exaggeration in his interpretations, [and] for the precision without rigidity of 
his tempos.”  Ronald Crichton,  Felix Weingartner, in THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS, XX, 315-16 (1980). 
97  Igor Markevich was an Italian conductor whose parents moved from Russia to Italy in 
1914, when he was two years old.  His performances combined “a volatile personality with 
meticulous attention to the composer’s instructions, and . . . [were] never weakened by 
sentimental indulgence of expression.”  Noël Goodwin,  Igor Markevich, in THE NEW GROVE 
DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS, XI, 691 (1980). 
98  IGOR MARKEVICH,  DIE SINFONIEN VON LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN:  HISTORISCHE, 
ANALYTISCHE UND PRACTISCHE STUDIEN, 208 (1983)(“Da] dies wohlbegründet ist, dürfte au]er 
Zweifel stehen.”)(translation by the author).  Tastes change relatively quickly.  Although it might 
have been rare to hear the trumpet line in these measures played as written when del Mar was 
writing in 1981, the opposite is, I think, true today. 
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These are, of course, classic espousals of the contextualist’s “living document” 
rationale:  what once was impossible is now possible and since it is better this 
way we should do it.99  But it is possible to justify the rewrite on intentionalist 
grounds as well:  Beethoven intended the line to go up, as the evidence from the 
rest of the orchestration demonstrates, and the only thing preventing him from 
putting the trumpets with the other melody instruments appears to have been 
the technical limitation placed on him by the trumpet’s construction.  Under this 
rationale, contemporary technology allows us to restore Beethoven’s original 
intent, making the altered version more “original,” in a way, than what 
Beethoven actually wrote.  Even Toscanini, who claimed to be devoted to the 
purity of the written text over any notions of personal interpretative preference, 
made this change.100 
 
This presents an interesting problem for the doctrinal textualist, like Justice 
Scalia.   The written text itself is clear and unambiguous;  the trumpets literally 
go down, not up.  But Justice Scalia, as we have seen, is not a literalist – he will 
bend a little if a word or a phrase can fairly be interpreted as including a non-
articulated meaning.101  And just as “speech” can, in his view, encompass 
handwritten words, perhaps the Eroica theme can be interpreted to encompass a 
note that only technology prevented Beethoven from writing.  The First 
Amendment can be extended to encompass technologies that did not exist in the 
1790s.102  Perhaps this is no different. 
 
Or perhaps it is going too far.  Perhaps this is merely a justification for 
evolutionary interpretation, something a textualist like Justice Scalia cannot 
permit.  But as we have seen, the tradition of rewriting the trumpet line is well 
established and Justice Scalia is willing to accept another “pragmatic exception” 
                                                 
99  Although not speaking specifically about the trumpet line in the Eroica coda, Otto 
Klemperer, one of the most distinguished conductors of the twentieth century, gave this defense 
of “retouching” the orchestration in Beethoven symphonies:  “I don’t do as much as Mahler did, 
and then only where I find if absolutely necessary.  But in some passages it is;  if only because, for 
instance, there were in Beethoven’s time no valves in horns and trumpets.  Everything had to be 
played on natural brass instruments which must have sounded terrible.  Then again, where there 
is a melody or a melodic theme in the first violins which I want to bring out, I also give it to the 
second violins, and the second violin parts I give to some of the violas, so that it is still there.  . . .  
[I]n the Funeral march of the Eroica, I begin with eight violins and use all sixteen only later.”  
CONVERSATIONS WITH KLEMPERER, 35 (Peter Heyworth ed., 1973). 
100  As demonstrated by his famous 1939 recording of the Eroica.  ARTURO TOSCANINI,  
LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (RCA Victor Gold Seal 1992). 
101  See, supra nn. 83-84 and accompanying text. 
102  See, Scalia, supra n.1, at 45 (describing the Supreme Court’s application of the First 
Amendment’s “freedom of speech” guarantee “to new technologies that did not exist when the 
guarantee was created – to sound trucks, or to government-licensed over-the-air television” by 
following “the trajectory of the First Amendment, so to speak, to determine what it requires. . . .”) 
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to his core textualist principles to allow for stare decisis.103  And while there is no 
direct doctrinal musical equivalent to the stare decisis doctrine, it does not seem 
too far a stretch to see Justice Scalia the conductor, perhaps grudgingly, 
accepting this rewrite as something that is well-founded “beyond doubt.”  
Assuming, of course, that he has made a pitch decision that allows for the 
inclusion of trumpets of sufficiently recent vintage to allow them to play the high 
Bb. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
What do we as lawyers learn from this brief excursion into a parallel 
interpretative universe?  Perhaps nothing more than that it is comforting to know 
we are not alone:  other disciplines have interpretative problems with which they 
wrestle and musicians, at least, have devised some strategies for resolving those 
problems that map directly onto the strategies lawyers and judges have adopted.  
A problem shared is, if nothing else, a problem shared. 
 
Perhaps, though, looking at musical interpretation might allow us to have a 
discussion about the appropriateness of different approaches to modes of textual 
interpretation without being drawn into the polarizing debate about social issues 
affected by Constitutional decisions.104  Being able to talk about the pitfalls and 
benefits of textualism, contextualism, and intentionalism without having to 
consider abortion, school prayer, or any of the other current controversies could 
be both constructive and refreshing. 
 
And we have only scratched the surface.  This paper, as with most other papers 
dealing with the issue, focused on performance practice – the decisions a 
performer makes when deciding how to play a piece of music;  what Eb we 
should play when we see a note occupying the place on the stave we associate 
with Eb.  The more profound inquiry, however, is what that Eb means, how we 
can discern the deeper meaning of text through close analysis, and whether that 
inquiry can tell us anything about deciphering deeper meaning in texts than 
merely looking to what the words mean.105  That inquiry will, I hope, be the 
subject of subsequent work. 
 
                                                 
103  Scalia, supra n.1, at 140. 
104  This is not even remotely to suggest that I do not think these musical decisions are 
important, or that they “matter” less than Constitutional decisions. 
105  That is, of course, the premise behind the law and literature movement as well.  As noted 
infra, whether or not this movement has fully realized the promise of its approach is beyond my 
scope here. 
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Looking at the rise of the historically informed performance practice movement 
in music106 also raises the intriguing image of a created culture and the invention 
of an interpretative strategy that owes little, if anything, to the organic 
development of performance practice, a strangely ahistorical process.107  Whether 
such an inquiry can shed insights into the development and intellectual validity 
of Justice Scalia’s neo-textualism is also a matter for further study. 
 
What we are left with at present is the strange and slightly unsettling image of 
Justice Scalia, the radical conductor, cocking a snook at the conservative musical 
establishment by leading a performance of Eroica that is faster and flatter than 
we are used to hearing, and likely with period instruments and orchestral 
proportions – much like the performances recorded by Roger Norrington or John 
Elliot Gardiner108 –  yet which has some puzzling textual deviations that, it could 
be argued, are more rooted in an intentionalist or even contextualist approach 
than a textualist should be willing to accept, much like the performances 
recorded by, for example, Furtwängler109 or Karajan.110  How Justice Scalia 
would respond to such a performance were he to hear it is an interesting 
question to ponder. 
                                                 
106  For a brief introduction to the rise of the historically informed performance practice 
movement, and the clashes it generated with the more “contextualist” musical performance 
mainstream, see Sherman, supra n.34;  Howard Mayer Brown,  Pedantry or Liberation?  A Sketch of 
the Historical Performance Movement, in AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MUSIC:  A SYMPOSIUM, 27 
(Nicholas Kenyon ed., 1988). 
107  Levinson and Balkin touch on this aspect of the early music movement.  Levinson and 
Balkin, supra n.12, at 1627-33. 
108  Norrington, supra, n.52.;  JOHN ELLIOT GARDINER,  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY 
NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” (Deutsche Grammophon 1994). 
109  See, e.g.,  WILHELM FURTWÄNGLER,  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 
“EROICA” (EMI Classics 2000)(originally recorded in 1953). 
110  HERBERT VON KARAJAN,  LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, SYMPHONY NO. 3, OP. 55 “EROICA” 
(Deutsche Grammophon 2003)(originally recorded in 1962). 
